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I. Introduction
Unpaid work is a notable phenomenon in most industrialized labor markets, in particular for
white collar workers. Recent studies for Germany and the UK (Bauer/Zimmermann (1999),
Bell/Hart 1999, Bell/Hart/Hübler/Schwerdt 2000, Pannenberg/Wagner 2001) show that in
West Germany roughly one out of three white collar workers and in Great Britain more than
50% of all managers, foremen and supervisors work unpaid overtime. Moreover, averaged
across all workers the weekly amounts of worked unpaid overtime hours are at least as high as
the paid for overtime hours in both countries. In addition it is pointed out that the estimated
returns to education, experience and tenure in a standard Mincerian hourly wage equation
framework are remarkably lower if one adjusts hourly wages for unpaid overtime hours
(Bell/Hart 1999, Bell/Hart/Hübler/Schwerdt 2000).
In view of the observed amounts of unpaid overtime we have to ask whether the notion that
this type of overtime is “unpaid” is really appropriate. Economic theory provides at least four
different classes of explanations
1 that there is no such thing as “unpaid” overtime: (1)
Employers and employees uncertainty about the required effort to conduct specific complex
tasks leads to contracts that specify for example yearly income combined with a performance-
related pay scheme but do not specify a binding standard working week. This might lead to
persistent “unpaid” overtime beyond the non binding standard working week. (2) Overtime
pay regulation at the industry level, like that observed in Germany, might lead to
combinations of paid and unpaid overtime as a bargained agreement between employers and
employees at the firm level to circumvent these regulations. (3) Unpaid overtime might be
part of a gift exchange between an employer and an employee; e.g., employees respond to
employer-financed on-the-job training with unpaid overtime. (4) If firms use promotions to
sort workers within hierarchies, workers exert effort in terms of current unpaid overtime
among others to be promoted to better paid positions in the future. Moreover, even without
                                                          
1  See Bell/Hart (1999) for a survey.2
explicit promotion policies workers might provide unpaid overtime, since within a forward
looking labor supply model, the workers current amount of (unpaid) work hours has an impact
on their advance in the distribution of earnings and this effect increases with a rise in earnings
inequality (Bell/Freeman 2001).
There is some empirical evidence consistent with the sketched hypotheses. As quoted above, a
lot of studies provide evidence that the likelihood of unpaid overtime increases in
qualification. Since on average the complexity of a job increases with the required
qualification these results are in line with hypothesis (1). Evidence consistent with the
compensating differential hypothesis (2) is provided by Trejo for the US (1991). Trejo shows
that workers and employers adjust the hourly wage in response to a change in the overtime
premium. Pannenberg (2002) provides some evidence for a positive correlation of unpaid
overtime and on-the-job training for West Germany, which is in line with hypothesis (3).
Moreover, Booth et al (2002)  and Francesconi (2001) provide evidence for a significant
correlation of overtime hours worked and subsequent promotions in Great Britain, though
Booth et al. (2002) do not find varying effects for paid and unpaid overtime. Bell/Freeman
(2001) provide supportive evidence for their forward looking labor supply model using data
for the US and Germany.
In this paper we add to the existing empirical literature by assessing the long-term impact of
unpaid overtime on labor earnings for Germany. We use panel data for West Germany over
the period 1988 to 2000 to analyze cumulative average  effects of unpaid overtime on labor
earnings. We start with a brief description of the data and some descriptive evidence on the
incidence and amount of unpaid overtime for our specific subsample (section II). We then
provide descriptive evidence of the relationship between unpaid overtime and long-term labor
earnings growth (section III). In section IV we use panel data models to assess whether
observed cumulative average unpaid overtime has an impact on labor earnings. Section V
concludes with a discussion of our results.3
II. Data and basic trends
Our empirical analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP
is a nationally representative longitudinal data set for Germany which was first conducted in
1984 (Wagner et al. 1993, SOEP Group 2001). We use data for the years 1988 up to 2000.
2
Our analysis is restricted to full-time workers living in West Germany aged 18 up to 65 in the
relevant years. These workers have to remain with their firm for their specific set of
observations but might experience mobility within the firm like promotions or demotions. The
restriction to job stayers allows us to disentangle the long-term impact of cumulative unpaid
overtime from individual and firm specific fixed effects as well as individual and firm specific
time trends. Furthermore, workers in the public sector, in agricultural, fishing or private
households, self-employed persons and respondents with missing information on wages,
standard and actual hours worked, overtime hours and overtime compensation are dropped.
Information on overtime and overtime compensation stems from questions on the amount of
overtime in the last month preceding the interview and on usual types of overtime compensa-
tion. The questionnaire allows us to differentiate between paid overtime, unpaid overtime,
overtime compensated with hours or days off and a partly paid/partly compensated with extra
time off category. The wage measure used is the monthly gross real labor earnings in the
months preceding the interview including overtime payments. Bonuses such as a 13
th or 14
th
month salary, holiday pay, profit related pay or bonuses are drawn from the subsequent wave,
divided by 12 and added to the monthly wage measure.
Table 1 displays the shares of the different types of overtime compensation for workers with
overtime work in the month before the interview and their average amount of overtime hours
for our subsample of job stayers. With respect to the shares of overtime compensation we do
observe a share of unpaid overtime of roughly 21% of all workers with overtime incidence,
which decomposes to 32 % for white collar and 3% for blue-collar workers. This is close to
                                                          
2 From 1988 on the required information on overtime work and working hours is provided for each year.4
the figures found in studies which do not restrict themselves to job stayers.
 3 Moreover, table 1
reveals a dramatic decrease in paid overtime over the whole period and a remarkable increase
in “extra days off later on“ like other studies do. The later mirrors the fact that in Germany
both unions and employers associations are pushing so called individual “working time
accounts” since the beginning of the 90’s: Overtime hours are transferred into these accounts,
when workers are required to work overtime due to short run fluctuations in product demand
and overtime hours have to be drawn from these accounts within a given period when short-
run product demand allows for a transitory reduction of individual working hours
respectively. Employers surely prefer “working time accounts” over paid overtime to cope
with short-run fluctuations of labour demand, since the transactions costs of a flexible
working time scheme, once it is set up, are lower than costs due to overtime premiums.
Unions support these accounts in light of the idea of work-sharing, i.e. the notion of
transforming paid overtime into transitory overtime and allocating the remaining definite
amount of overtime hours to unemployed workers.
The average amount of overtime worked, conditional on overtime incidence, under different
overtime compensation regimes over all years varies between 2.9 hours for “extra days off
later on” up to 6.6 hours per week for workers with unpaid overtime. Note that in all years the
average amount of overtime hours with no pay in the month before the interview is greater
than or equal to the average amount of worked overtime hours within any other compensation
system.
III. Descriptive Evidence
Table 2 shows the change in log real monthly labor earnings over a 10-year period by the type
of overtime compensation for overtime hours worked in the relevant period.
4 Workers with no
overtime at all experience a median real earnings growth of roughly 7%, while the 25
th
                                                          
3  See Bauer/Zimmermann (1999) or Pannenberg/Wagner (2001).
4  See Table A1 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics of all variables for our subsample.5
percentile of their real earnings growth distribution is negative (-7 log points) and their 75
th
percentile is 17 log points. If we calculate the 10-year growth in real labor earnings for
workers with either paid overtime or no overtime at all, we find that their median labor
earnings growth is about 10% and the 25
th and 75
th percentile are 5% and 22%, respectively.
If we calculate the median growth in earnings for workers with “working time accounts” at
least in one year and any combination of paid overtime and no overtime work in the
remaining years, median growth in real earnings is remarkably higher at 14% for these group
of workers as is the 25
th- and 75
th percentile of their earnings growth distribution. If we
additionally allow for unpaid overtime in at least one year and any combination of other forms
of overtime compensation or no overtime at all in the remaining years, we do find the highest
median growth in real labor earnings for this group of workers (25 log points) as well as the
highest 25
th (11 log points) and 75
th percentiles (48 log points). Hence, a naive comparison of
groups of workers with different overtime incidence and different overtime compensation
patterns shows varying patterns of wage growth over a 10-year period and in particular finds
that the group of workers with at least some incidence of unpaid overtime over the 10-year
period experiences the highest median wage growth.
To extend the descriptive exploration of our data we estimate a simultaneous quantile
regression model for 10-year growth in real labor earnings with three quantiles (0.25, 0.50 and
0.75). This exercise reveals whether we do observe significant correlation between different
combinations of incidence and compensation of overtime work and long-term wage growth at
different parts of the long-term real earnings growth distribution while also conditioning on
within firm mobility as well as a set of individual characteristics like gender, age or education.
Table 3 shows the results of this exercise. First of all, we do not observe a significant
correlation between the incidence of paid overtime and long-term real earnings growth over
the entire earnings growth distribution. Moreover, we find a significant correlation over the
10-year period between the incidence of overtime work compensated with extra days off later6
and long-term real earnings growth as well as between unpaid overtime and long-term
earnings growth over the entire growth distribution. Testing for differences in estimated
coefficients for each type of overtime compensation across quantiles, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of common parameters across the earnings growth distribution. Hence, we use
standard linear panel data models in the following section to assess the long-term impact of
unpaid overtime. Furthermore, note that we do observe a significant positive correlation




Our wage measure is the real monthly labor earnings including possible paid overtime
earnings as well as the monthly share of performance-related pay received in the relevant
year. In our empirical work we use the following framework similar to the one suggested by
Hunt (1999) and apply it to the problem at hand. The straight-time hourly wage of a worker i






























it w is the straight-time hourly wage,  it otup is the average weekly amount of unpaid
overtime, measured by the difference of  average actual hours worked including any overtime
and bargained weekly standard hours  s h and combined with the information on the type of
overtime compensation,  it otwacc is the average weekly amount of overtime compensated with
extra days off later on
5,  it I is an indicator variable with  1 it I =  if a valid observation is
                                                          
5  If the respondent answers that overtime work is usually partly paid, partly compensated with extra days off
later on, we use on half of the average amount of overtime worked.7
available,  it X is a vector of additional characteristics,  it γ is an individual-specific time trend
in labor earnings, which allows for heterogeneous individual growth rates,  i α is an individual
fixed effect and  it ε is an error term.
The monthly wage 
m
it w is defined as
(2)  (4.33* (1 )* )
mh P
it it s M ww h p O T =+ +
where p is the overtime premium and 
P
M OT  (0.5 * 
P
M OT ) is the amount of overtime hours
worked in the month where monthly labor earnings including any overtime is collected if their
overtime is usually paid (partly paid/partly compensated with extra time off).










































































































The parameters of primary interest are  1 θ and  2 θ . They pick up the correlation with ln( )
m
iz w of
the cumulative average amount of unpaid overtime per week, and the cumulative average
amount of overtime worked per week within a working time account scheme for the period
t=1 to t=z, respectively. They are therefore indicators for cumulative effects of unpaid
overtime (working time accounts). The reason for explicitly modeling the cumulative effect of8
working time accounts are twofold: First, these accounts sometimes are not balanced within
the bargained period and are thus essentially “converted” to unpaid overtime. Second, we do
observe an increase in long-term working time accounts, where workers accumulate overtime
deposits over very long periods and we want to pick up the earnings effects of this persistent
overtime effort over a longer time period.
We estimate two versions of equation (3). The first one employs the restriction  0 i γ = and thus
amounts to estimating a standard fixed-effects model. The second version allows for fixed
effects as well as an individual specific time trend in monthly real labor earnings. This
specification picks up unobserved individual characteristics that influence not only the wage
level, but that also have an impact on the individual specific rate of earnings growth. Note
furthermore, that due to the fact that we analyze a sample of job stayers the general
specification also wipe out firm specific fixed effects and implicitly controls for a firm
specific real earnings trend. The estimated parameter for  () ln s h is restricted to 1, but we do
not impose a restriction on (1 ) p + since overtime premiums might vary across workers and
imposing the average German overtime premium of  0.25 p =  slightly influences our
estimates of  1 θ and  2 θ . We estimate both versions separately for male and female workers.
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity in the standard fixed effects estimation. The
full model is estimated by first differencing equation (3), wiping out  i α , and then applying a
Within estimator to the resulting equation in order to sweep out  i γ . Standard errors in this
case are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation along the lines suggested by
Arellano (1987).
7
To sketch long-term effects of overtime work that is not directly remunerated we use the full
unbalanced set of observations of workers in our subsample with at least an observed 10-year
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6  The approximation log (1+x) ≈  x is applied in step 3.9
growth in labor earnings. Longitudinal attrition factors, calculated from the staying
probabilities supplied with the survey, are used in all estimations in order to take into account
panel attrition.
8 The X vector includes bargained weekly standard hours  s h  and a variable for
the number of within firm job changes. A full set of time dummies is also included in all
specifications.
Results
Table 4 displays the results of our estimation exercise. Column 1 and 2 show the results for
male and female workers employing the restriction  0 i γ = , i.e., using a standard fixed effects
model. The estimated parameters for the cumulative average effect of unpaid overtime are in
both cases significantly positive and the effect for females is slightly higher
9 than the one for
males. Hence, we do find long-term effects of unpaid overtime: A persistent increase in
average unpaid overtime work of one hour per week goes along with an increase in hourly
real labor earnings of 2 log points for male workers and 3 log points for female workers. Note
that this result holds while controlling for the number of internal job changes in previous
years. On average one internal job change is associated with an increase in hourly real
earnings of 8 log points.
10
The estimated parameter for the cumulative average effect of overtime worked which is
compensated by extra days off later on is significantly positive for male workers and
significantly higher (
2(1) 8.2 χ = ) than the corresponding one for unpaid overtime worked.
Working overtime persistently within a working time account scheme is therefore also
correlated with long-term earnings for men in the restricted specification. This is consistent
with at least two explanations: (1) As mentioned above deposits in working time accounts are
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7  See also Greene (2000) for a discussion of this procedure, which is a combination of the White and the
Newey-West estimator.
8  See Wooldridge (2002, pp. 577) for a detailed discussion.
9  The difference in the estimated coefficients between male and female workers with respect to unpaid overtime
is not significantly different from zero in a pooled model with interaction terms for gender and overtime work.10
often “converted” to unpaid overtime after the phasing out of the balancing period. Under this
assumption the estimated parameters for both types of overtime work should be similar. (2)
Workers with remarkable amounts of worked overtime within a working time accounts
scheme might have unobserved characteristics that also have an impact on their individual
earnings growth, e.g. high ability workers are the first to be chosen by employers to work
overtime compensated by extra days off later on when cyclical fluctuations of product
demand require additional labor input. We do not pick up such effects by a standard fixed
effects approach.
For females we also do observe a significantly positive parameter of overtime worked within
a working time account scheme which is similar to the one for unpaid overtime
11. As opposed
to male workers however, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients
for the two types of cumulative average overtime are identical for female workers
(
2(1) 1.3 χ = ).
Our estimates for the effect of straight-time working hours are significantly negative for male
and female workers and confirm earlier results for the time period 1984 to 1994 provided by
Hunt (1999): a one-hour reduction in standard working hours is associated with a rise in
hourly labor earnings of roughly 2%.
It is possible that workers with high unobserved abilities not only have a higher earnings level
but also have higher labor earnings growth due to, for example, employers learning about
workers abilities. As outlined above, this might bias our estimated parameters. To check for
potential bias from unobserved heterogeneity related to individual wage growth, we estimate
equation (3) without imposing the restriction  0 i γ = . Column 3 and 4 reveal the results of this
exercise.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10  If we allow for interactions of our cumulative average overtime variables and the variable “number of job
changes” the regressions yield significantly positive coefficients for these interaction terms.
11  Note however, that we do find significant gender differences in estimated coefficients in a pooled model with
interactions of gender and overtime work with respect to working time accounts11
With respect to male workers, the estimated coefficient for the cumulative average amount of
unpaid overtime is significantly positive and identical to the one in the restricted specification.
Hence, we do find again significant long-term labor earnings effects associated with unpaid
overtime. The estimated coefficients for the cumulative average effect of overtime work
compensated by extra days off later on is only weakly significantly positive (α =0.1). Hence,
controlling for heterogeneous individual earnings growth rates absorbs the former correlation
between cumulative average overtime worked with extra days off later on and real labor
earnings for male workers. This is for example consistent with high ability workers primarily
chosen by employers when overtime work is required, as mentioned above.
Considering the cumulative effects of not straightly paid overtime for female workers, we find
that neither of the estimated parameters is significantly different from zero. Hence, controlling
for heterogeneous individual earnings growth rates picks up the former correlation between
both types of overtime work and real labor earnings for females. Therefore, we do find
significant long-term earnings differentials between male and female workers with respect to
unpaid overtime. Our results fit for example into the “sticky floor” model of pay and
promotion suggested by Booth et al. (2002). They argue that women are just as likely as men
to be promoted and therefore receive an initial wage increase on promotion. However, due to
either worse market alternatives or to less positive firm responses to outside offers for women,
women receive lower wage gains consequent upon promotion. In view of our estimates this
might imply that higher ability women experience higher individual earnings growth but that
controlling for a given number of promotions we do not find additional returns to investments
into unpaid overtime for them.
The estimated coefficients of straight-time hours are robust against the change in the
empirical specification for male and female workers. Note, that taking into account
heterogeneous individual earnings growth rates leads to insignificant parameter estimates for
within firm mobility.12
Checks of robustness
Our results rely on a subsample of job stayers with an observed (unbalanced) 10-year period
of earnings growth. To check the robustness of our results, we rerun our regressions for
subsamples with at least 3-year, 5-year and 7-year periods of earnings growth. Considering
male workers, we find that the estimated parameters for the cumulative average amount of
unpaid overtime are completely robust against changes in the selection criteria. Similarly, the
estimated parameters for the cumulative average effect of overtime work compensated by
extra days off later on do not change significantly (specification I). With respect to the size of
the estimated parameter for the cumulative average effect of overtime work compensated by
extra days off later on this also holds under specification II. However, we do observe slight
changes in the significance level (α =5% versus α =10%) in this case. Considering the results
for female workers, we do not find any significant changes in either cumulative overtime
parameters with respect to specification I. This is also true for the estimated parameters for
the cumulative average effect of overtime work compensated by extra days off later on under
specification 2. However the significance level slightly varies: Allowing for individual
earnings trends leads to insignificant parameters for overtime work compensated by extra
days off later on for the 3-year and the 10-year time spans while we do find a significant
impact of cumulative average unpaid overtime for the other two time periods (α =5%).
One might argue that education matters within our context and that our empirical specification
with fixed individual effects and an individual specific time trend in labor earnings does not
take this into account in an appropriate way. Therefore, we allow for an interaction of tenure
and education (measured by dummies for apprenticeship and university degree) in our
standard fixed effects approach (specification 1) and estimate the model using first differences
to eliminate the fixed effects. The results are in line with those of our prefered specification
(specification 2). With respect to male workers we find again a significant effect of the13
cumulative average amount of unpaid overtime, which is only slightly lower ( 
1 θ = 0.01).
However, for female workers we do not find a significant correlation between unpaid
overtime and labor earnings.
To check for observed individual earnings dynamics instead of allowing for an individual
earnings trend, we estimate a dynamic version of equation (3) by means of including a lagged
dependent variable and applying the restriction  0 i γ = . We apply both a (biased) Within
estimator and the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano/Bond to our subsamples. The
estimated parameters for both cumulative overtime variables are mostly in line with the
estimates presented in Table 4. However, the estimated parameters for the lagged dependent
variable using the Arellano/Bond estimator are very small (less than 0.1) for our sample of
male workers and sometimes even negative for female workers.
V.  Conclusion
  This study finds substantial long-term real labor earnings effects associated with unpaid
overtime for male job stayers in West Germany. Hence, we provide supportive evidence for
the hypothesis that the notion of unpaid overtime might be misleading – at least in the long
run. Rather, we might think of unpaid overtime as a current investment of workers which
leads on average to remarkable returns on investment later on.
Moreover, taking into account that unobserved individual characteristics influence not only
the level of real labor earnings but also individual real labor earnings growth, the significantly
positive long-term real labor earnings effect of unpaid overtime for females disappears. This
might point to the fact that high ability (and high effort) women receive higher earnings
growth, but firms do respond differently to additional effort in terms of unpaid overtime for
women and men owing to discrimination.
We find mixed evidence for long-term earnings effects associated with cumulative average
overtime work within a so-called working time account scheme. Using standard fixed effects14
specifications, we find a positive correlation between cumulative overtime with extra days off
later on and real labor earnings, which is more pronounced for males. However, in our
preferred empirical specification with individual heterogeneous labor earnings growth this
correlation vanishes for female workers and is only weakly significant for male workers.
Overall, our results point to the importance of investment in current working hours beyond the
standard work week to enhance real earnings prospects. Future research should model more
explicitly the connections between unpaid overtime, promotions and wage growth. Moreover,
the effects of working time accounts require a more detailed analysis on its own.
 12
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Table 1: Compensation of Overtime Work
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Share of overtime compensation (in %)
- paid overtime 41.4 42.5 42.3 42.4 40.4 37.8 32.7 34.0 29.3 22.1 21.3 17.1
- extra days off later on 18.7 19.9 19.4 22.1 21.1 21.5 23.8 24.3 29.1 30.8 35.9 39.7
- partly paid, partly extra days off later on 16.5 15.1 17.6 17.3 21.5 19.6 22.1 22.2 19.9 25.1 23.7 25.3
- unpaid overtime 23.4 22.5 20.7 18.2 16.9 21.1 21.3 19.4 21.7 22.7 19.9 17.9
Number of overtime hours (per week;ot=1)
- paid overtime 4.6 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.8 4.1 5.1 5.0 4.6 5.2 5.9
- extra days off later on 3.2 3.3 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.9
- partly paid, partly extra days off later on 4.7 4.8 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.5 5.0 4.2 5.1 5.1 4.9
- unpaid overtime 6.0 5.8 5.0 6.1 5.7 5.8 5.2 5.0 5.7 5.7 6.6 6.3
Source: GSOEP 1988-2000, sample of job stayers; sample weights are used.
Table 2: 10-year Growth in Real Monthly Labor Earnings
- changes in log monthly earnings -
Type of compensation of overtime work Median 25
th-percentile 75
th-percentile
- no overtime at all 0.07 -0.07 0.17
- only paid overtime in at least 1 year 0.10 -0.05 0.22
- working time accounts in at least 1 year 0.14 0.04 0.29
- unpaid overtime in at least 1 year 0.25 0.11 0.48
Source: GSOEP 1988-2000, sample of job stayers; sample weights are used.17





only paid overtime in at least 1 year -0.00 -0.01 0.01
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
working time accounts in at least 1 year 0.06 0.06 0.06
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
unpaid overtime in at least 1 year 0.07 0.08 0.09
[0.03] [0.02] [0.04]
within firm mobility (number) 0.04 0.06 0.07
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
standard hours 
s h -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
male -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
[0.03] [0.02] [0.02]
age (in years) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
german 0.01 0.01 0.02
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
apprenticeship 0.05 0.03 0.03
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
university degree 0.12 0.05 0.04
[0.05] [0.04] [0.07]
constant 0.43 0.50 0.64
[0.21] [0.14] [0.17]
Pseudo R
2 0.07 0.09 0.13
Number of Observations (N) 1134
    Source: GSOEP 1988-2000, sample of job stayers.
Simultaneous quantile regression.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses (1000 bootstrap replications).18
Table 4: Overtime Work and Real Labor Earnings
Specification 1 Specification 2
male female male female










cumulative average amount of




































Wald_X (d.f.) 1815.8 (16) 450.6 (16) 353.6 (15) 114.8 (15)
Number of Observations (N) 5813 1617 4798 1336
Number of Individuals 558 158 549 155
Source:  GSOEP 1988-2000, sample of job stayers; longitudinal attrition factors are used.
Panel data models based on equation (3) of main text with parameter restriction δ =1 for ln(hs).
Specification (1): Imposing γ i=0.  Specification (2): no restriction on γ i.
Full sets of time dummies are included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Wald_X: Wald – Test with H0: no joint significance of all unrestricted regressors.19
Appendix:
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Used Subsample
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Male 0.78 --
Log of monthly real labor earnings 8.46 0.35
Cumulative average amount of
unpaid overtime (per week)
0.36 1.53
Cumulative average amount of










Bargained weekly standard hours 38.13 1.81
Within firm mobility (number of job
changes)
0.13 0.41
Number of Observations 7430
Source: GSOEP 1988-2000, sample of job stayers.